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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SHAWN C. MCGUIRE,

Case No. 20030418-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant/Defendant Shawn C. McGuire ("Appellant" or "McGuire") appeals
from a conviction for Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory, a first degree felony.
R. 39-40. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (2002)
which creates jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over cases transferred by the Utah
Supreme Court. A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
Issue #1. Although the prosecutor and presentence investigation report ("PSI")
recommended probation, the trial judge sentenced McGuire to prison. Within ten days of
judgment, McGuire filed a "Motion to Reconsider Sentence." Does a trial court have
jurisdiction over a "motion to reconsider sentence"filedwithin ten days of judgment?
Preservation. McGuire preserved this issue byfilinga motion to reconsider
sentence within ten days of sentencing and arguing that the trial court had jurisdiction to

reconsider his sentence. R. 41-42, 52-54, 94.
Standard of Review. This issue involves the construction of the Rules of Civil
and Criminal Procedure and therefore presents a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Schofield. 2002 UT 132, ^[6, 63 P.3d 667 (reviewing statutes
delineating district and juvenile court jurisdiction as a question of law).
Issue #2. The prosecutor recommended probation as part of the plea bargain and
the PSI recommended probation based on, among other things, McGuire's minimal
criminal history, remorse, and cooperation with authorities. The trial court sent McGuire
to prison because the nature of McGuire's crime puts society at risk. Did the trial court
abuse its discretion in failing to personalize the sentence and by instead sentencing
McGuire to prison based solely on the nature of the crime charged?
Preservation. This issue was preserved. R. 82:3-4.
Standard of review. Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Helms. 2002 UT 12, f 8, 40 P.3d 626.

TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND STATUTES
The texts of the following court rules are in Addendum B:
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
Rule 81, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information dated May 7, 2002, the state charged Appellant/Defendant
Shawn C. McGuire with "Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment,"
enhanced to a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or
(b); Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii); and "Clandestine
Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment," a second degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b). R. 05-07.
On June 24, 2002, McGuire pled guilty to Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory
with one enhancement, a first degree felony. R. 23-30. As part of that plea bargain, the
state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and enhancements and recommend
probation. R. 23. The PSI likewise recommended probation. PSI.
Third District Judge Paul G. Maughan sentenced McGuire to prison on
August 12, 2002. R. 39. The judgment was signed on August 13, 2003. R. 40. On that
same day, August 13, 2002, McGuire filed a motion to reconsider sentence. R. 41-42.
Thereafter, the parties briefed the issue of whether the judge had jurisdiction to
reconsider the sentence and a hearing was held on the motion to reconsider sentence on
November 4, 2002. R. 41-2, 52-4, 63-7, 79. The trial court denied the motion on
April 1, 2003, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion to
reconsider sentence filed within ten days after judgment was entered. R. 69-71.
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McGuire filed a notice of appeal on April 30, 2003. R. 72-3.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
After McGuire pled guilty to a first degree felony Operation of a Clandestine
Laboratory, Adult Probation and Parole (f,AP&Pn) prepared a PSI. The PSI
recommended that the prison sentence be suspended and that McGuire be placed on
probation, with conditions that included serving one year in jail and completing
substance abuse and parenting treatment and counseling. R. 84. This recommendation
was based on McGuire's minimal criminal history, his cooperation with authorities, and
the facts of the crime, among other things. R. 84-89.
According to the PSI, while McGuire's "criminal history is very minimal,1' his
"biggest problem was alcohol until two years ago [he] went from a drug user to thinking
that cooking methamphetamine [would solve his financial problems]." R. 85. He was
without work and had two young sons to support. R. 88-89. McGuire was cooperative
with authorities and the PSI investigator and recognized that he had lost everything due
to his drug usage. R. 85. The PSI investigator noted that McGuire had been honest and
was taking responsibility for his actions, but that if McGuire did not change his life and
friends, "it will be a matter of time before he is sentenced to the Utah State Prison, but at
this time, I believe that the defendant should be given the opportunity of probation to
show that he can make those changes." R. 85.
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The incident in this case involved detection of a methamphetamine laboratory at
McGuire's residence. R. 86. Officers went to the residence after responding to a call by
going to a home nearby, then being directed to McGuire's address. R. 85. Officers
smelled a chemical smell when McGuire opened the door. R. 85. McGuire then
consented to a search. R. 86. Officers found a laboratory in the bathroom and arrested
McGuire and his common-law wife, Lisa Heaney, both of whom were present. R. 86.
After being Mirandized, McGuire spoke openly with officers. R. 86. He told
them "he was glad it was over." R. 86. "He stated that the lab was running for about two
weeks," and told the officers where he had purchased materials. R. 86. He also told the
officers that this was the third time he had tried to cook methamphetamine in his home,
but that "the two prior times the product did not turn out right." R. 86. Finally, McGuire
told officers "he was cooking methamphetamine to save his house." R. 86.
At sentencing, defense counsel reiterated that McGuire had "made some really bad
choices and bad decisions about how to handle a financial situation," but pointed out that
he was extremely cooperative and remorseful, and was willing to follow terms of
probation. R. 82:3-4. Defense counsel suggested that if the court were to give McGuire
the recommended one year in jail, perhaps the court would consider an early release so
that McGuire could complete an in-patient drug treatment program. R. 82:4. As part of
the plea bargain, the state agreed to recommend probation. R. 23. At sentencing, the
state "agree[d] with the year in jail with no credit for good time." R. 82:5. The
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prosecutor, who was standing in for the prosecutor assigned to the case, then added,
without elaboration, that the prosecutor assigned to the case "feels that the defendant is
fortunate it's not a prison recommendation." R. 82:5.
The trial judge refused to follow the probation recommendation. R. 82:5. The
judge's reason for refusing to follow the recommendation was the nature of the crime.
R. 82:5. According to the judge, prison was warranted because McGuire had cooked
methamphetamine and that crime causes risk to the community. R. 82:5. The judge
stated:
. . . this is the third time you tried to do it, and were having a hard time
complying. In my opinion, there's a bigger issue besides just your personal
use and your involvement in the operation of a lab, and that's it's very
concerning to the rest of the community and the rest of this society. And I
believe it's a plague on our community.
Once we start manufacturing, once we start trying to cook this kind
of material, methamphetamine, it affects children's lives. It affects your
life. It puts at risk your life or anybody involved in the process, those
around you. You're subject to possible exposure, fires, other
contamination.
R. 82:5. Without mentioning anything else, the judge sentenced McGuire to prison
because his crime of operating a clandestine laboratory created a risk to the community.
R. 82:5-6; see transcript of sentencing hearing in Addendum C.
The day after sentencing, McGuire filed a motion to reconsider sentence. R. 41.
In that motion, McGuire indicated that he had new information from the arresting officer.
R. 41. In addition, the motion indicates that input from the prosecutor assigned to the
case, who was not present at sentencing, was relevant. R. 41.
6

The parties filed memoranda and the judge held a hearing on whether he had
jurisdiction to reconsider the sentence. R. 94. The trial court ultimately ruled that it did
not have jurisdiction to reconsider the sentence and denied the motion to reconsider
sentence. R. 69-71.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A trial court has jurisdiction under Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
reconsider a sentence when a criminal defendant files a motion requesting
reconsideration of sentence within ten days of judgment. The Rules of Civil Procedure
apply in criminal cases where there is no other applicable rule or statute and application
of the civil procedure rule does not conflict with a statute or constitutional provision.
The Rules of Criminal Procedure do not contain an applicable rule and there is no statute
that applies or conflicts with the application of Rule 59(e). In case law, this Court has
recognized the application of Rule 59(e) to criminal cases. And, application of
Rule 59(e) to criminal cases promotes judicial economy, orderly procedure, efficiency,
and fairness. The trial court in this case erred in concluding that it did not have
jurisdiction to reconsider McGuire's sentence where McGuire filed a motion to
reconsider sentence within ten days of judgment.
The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing McGuire to prison based solely
on the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty. Due process and Rule 22(a) require
that a sentence be personalized to a defendant. The judge in this case ignored McGuire's
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minimal criminal history, amenability to treatment and probation, remorse, cooperation,
and other positive attributes, and sentenced McGuire to prison based solely on the fact
that the operation of methamphetamine laboratories is a "plague" and danger to society.
By failing to personalize this sentence, the trial court abused its discretion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
RECONSIDER THE SENTENCE AND ALTER THE JUDGMENT
IMPOSED IN THIS CASE.
The trial court sentenced McGuire on August 12, 2002 and signed and entered
judgment the next day. On August 13, 2002, McGuire filed a "Motion to Reconsider
Sentence." R. 41. The trial court had jurisdiction to hear this motion under Rule 59(e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court's denial of the motion based on its
conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction must therefore be reversed.
While neither the Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Rules of Civil Procedure
refer to a "motion to reconsider sentence," the caption does not control the
characterization of a motion. See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061,
1064 (Utah 1991); State v. Parker. 872 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Salt Lake
City v. Guffev, 2001 UT App 17 (unpublished). Instead, courts consider the substance
of the motion in determining whether a motion is cognizable under the Rules of Civil or
Criminal Procedure. See Parker, 872 P.2d at 1044 ("In determining the character of a
motion, the substance of the motion, not its caption, is controlling."). The substance of
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McGuire's motion requesting that the trial court reconsider the sentence it had imposed
fits squarely within post-judgment motions authorized by Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. See generally Browder v. Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 261 (1978)
(recognizing that a motion for reconsideration falls under Rule 59, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to file a motion for new
trial or to alter or amend judgment within ten days of judgment. That rule states in part:
Rule 59. New trials; amendment of judgment
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in
an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the
entry of a new judgment:
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than
10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 59.
Rule 59(e), which gives the trial court jurisdiction to alter or amend any judgment
if a party files a motion within ten days of judgment, is applicable to criminal cases since
there is no applicable criminal rule or statute. See. Guffey, 2001 UT App 17 (recognizing
that Rule 59(e) applies in criminal cases and grants trial courts jurisdiction over timely
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post-trial motions that can be characterized as motions to alter or amend judgment). In
Guffey, the defendant filed an objection to the trial court's findings and conclusions a
day after the order was entered. Id \2. This Court recognized that the objection
qualified as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e), stating:
[tjhough not captioned as such, the objection was in substance a postjudgment motion to amend the judgment. "[A] motion filed within ten
days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the court's
findings and conclusions is properly treated as a post-judgment motion
under either Rules 52(b) or 59(e)." DeBry v. Fidelity National Title
Insurance Co.. 828 P.2d 520, 522-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Id. f3. Additionally, "this court has stated 'that regardless of its caption, "a motion filed
within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the court's
findings and conclusions is properly treated as a post-judgment motion under either
Rules 52(b) or 59(e)."'" Cameron v. State. 2002 UT App 301, %3 (unpublished) (quoting
Reeves v. Steinfeldt. 915 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting DeBrv . 828
P.2d at 522)). Moreover, motions for reconsideration of sentence have been tacitly
approved in cases such as State v. Samora, 2002 UT App 384, ^|6, 59 P.3d 604, where
this Court noted that the trial court had reconsidered and altered the sentence after the
defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence. Id.
Rule 81(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further demonstrates that Rule 59(e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applies in criminal cases. Rule 81(e) dictates that the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apply in circumstances "where there is no other applicable
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory or
10

constitutional requirement." Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e). Because there is no applicable statute
or criminal procedure rule and application of Rule 59(e) to criminal cases does not
conflict with statutory or constitutional requirements, Rule 81(e) mandates that
Rule 59(e) applies in criminal cases.
Although Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a trial judge to
disturb a verdict and grant a motion for new trial that is filed within ten days of
judgment, that rule does not expressly address circumstances such as those in the present
case where the defendant has pled guilty and does not seek to disturb a verdict but
instead is asking for reconsideration of the sentence. Rule 24 states in part:
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety
which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition
of sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the tenday period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned
either in evidence or in argument.
Utah R. Crim P. 24. Because Rule 24 is silent as to post-judgment motions other than
motions for new trial, it is not applicable to circumstances where a defendant seeks to
alter or amend the judgment by reconsidering the sentence and does not conflict with the
grant of Rule 59(e) allowing motions to alter or amend judgment.
Moreover, no other criminal rule or statute is applicable to these circumstances or
conflicts with the grant of Rule 59(e). The state argued below that Rule 22(e), Utah
11

Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in
an illegal manner to be corrected at any time, governs circumstances where the defendant
seeks resentencing. R. 64. While Rule 22(e) does allow a trial court jurisdiction to
correct an illegal sentence at any time, it does not apply to circumstances such as this
where, within ten days of judgment, the defendant asks the trial court to reconsider
sentence and alter or amend the judgment prior to its becoming final.
A motion to alter or amend judgment affects the finality of the judgments and
necessarily delays the finality of the original judgment. See Regan v. Blount, 1999 UT
App 154, f l , 978 P.2d 1051 (a timely motion under Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure suspends the finality of the judgment). A motion under Rule 59(e) allows
"'speedy disposition and finality5" (Browder, 434 U.S. 257, 271 (1978) (further citations
omitted), providing an efficient means for a trial judge to amend a judgment without
requiring further use of resources in a time consuming appeal. See generally Clipper
Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau. Inc., 674 F. 2d 1252, 1260 (9 th Cir.
1980) (citing United States v. Walker. 601 F.2d 1051, 1058 (9 th Cir. 1979)) ("Rule 59(e)
provides an efficient mechanism by which a trial court judge can correct an otherwise
erroneous judgment without implicating the appellate process").
By contrast, a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 22(e) allows a
defendant unlimited time to return to the trial court and correct a sentence that was
imposed in an illegal manner or that was illegal. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Rule 22(e)
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does not suspend the finality of the judgment and does not provide a means for speedy
resolution without invoking the appellate process. Instead, Rule 22(e) is a mechanism
that allows a trial court to correct an illegally imposed sentence, no matter how much
time has passed. Because Rule 22(e) does not suspend the finality of the judgment, it
does not apply to requests to amend a criminal judgment that are made within ten days of
sentencing; it therefore does not pre-empt the Rule 59(e)'s grant of jurisdiction to the
trial court to alter or amend a sentence when the motion is filed within ten days.
The state also argued below that since the Board of Pardons has authority pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1) (1999) to determine a defendant's actual release date,
the trial court loses jurisdiction the moment judgment is entered and a motion to alter and
amend judgment cannot be heard by the trial court. R. 66; see. Addendum D containing
text of Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (1999). The fallacy of this argument is evident in the
fact that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain motions for new trial without
conflicting with the Board of Pardons' authority. The trial court likewise has jurisdiction
to alter or amend judgment when a timely motion is filed without interfering with the
Board's authority. Guffey, 2001 UT App 17. This is so because timely post-judgment
motions under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 59, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure suspend the finality of the judgment. See Regan, 1999 UT App 154, ^[4.
Section 77-27-5(1) contains nothing that conflicts with a trial court's exercise of its
authority to alter or correct a judgment and instead simply clarifies that the Board of
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Pardons has the authority to set parole dates and to otherwise determine whether a
sentence is commuted or terminated after a judgment becomes final. See. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-27-5 (1999).
The state also argued below that this Court's decision in State v. Montoya. 825
P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) precludes a motion for reconsideration. R. 65.
Montoya, however, did not involve a motion for reconsideration filed within ten days of
judgment. Instead, Montoya involved an attempt to resentence a defendant long after the
thirty days for filing a notice of appeal had passed. This Court's determination that the
trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to resentence Montoya because the
initial sentence was valid was based on the fact that the judgment had become final well
before the request for resentencing and Montoya did not have a basis for resentencing
under Rule 22(e) because the sentence was not illegal or imposed in an illegal manner.
Since a timely motion under Rule 59(e) suspends the finality of a judgment, Montoya's
holding that the trial court could not resentence the defendant after the judgment became
final does not resolve the issue in this case of whether a criminal defendant can file a
motion for resentencing within ten days of judgment.
The purpose of allowing the trial court jurisdiction over timely post-judgment
motions is to give the trial court the opportunity to correct any errors that might exist and
thereby "end controversies before an appeal becomes necessary . . . . " State v. Sixteen
Thousand Dollars, 914 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah App. 1996). In addition, allowing the trial
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court the opportunity to resolve the claim prior to appeal flrequire[s] the parties to
crystallize the issues prior to appeal" and otherwise flserve[s] the interests of judicial
economy and orderly procedure." LI at 1179. This purpose is served by treating
motions for reconsideration of sentence as motions to alter or amend judgment under
Rule 59(e) and allowing trial courts to reconsider the sentence imposed if a motion is
filed within ten days of judgment. The trial court in this case seemed to recognize the
fairness and efficiency in allowing a motion for reconsideration when it asked the
prosecutor, "isn't it in everyone's best interest to be able to handle that [request for
reconsideration] quickly and efficiently [in the trial court?]" R. 94:18.
Allowing trial courts to reconsider sentence or otherwise alter or amend judgment
when a defendant makes a timely motion provides an efficient means by which trial
courts can alter their sentences without invoking the appellate process. Where
McGuire's motion for reconsideration was timely under Rule 59(e), the trial court
incorrectly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to reconsider McGuire's sentence.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING MCGUIRE TO PRISON.
Despite the recommendation of both AP&P and the prosecutor and facts
demonstrating that McGuire was a good candidate for probation, the trial judge
sentenced McGuire to prison. R. 82:4-6. The trial court's decision to send McGuire to
prison was based entirely on the nature of the crime and the fact that manufacturing
methamphetamine subjects members of society to danger. R. 82:5. The judge stated:
15

- - this is the third time you tried to do it, and were having a hard time
complying. In my opinion, there's a bigger issue besides just your personal
use and your involvement in the operation of a lab, and that's it's very
concerning to the rest of the community and the rest of this society. And I
believe it's a plague on the community.
Once we start manufacturing, once we start trying to cook this kind of
material, methamphetamine, it affects children's lives. It affects your life.
It puts at risk your life or anybody involved in the process, those around
you. You're subject to possible exposure, fires, and other contamination.
So, I'm going against the recommendation in this case, and I'm going to
sentence you to five years to life in the state penitentiary. And I'm not
trying to send that message to anybody, I'm just telling you my opinion.
Methamphetamine labs are something that will not be tolerated.
R. 82:5-6. The trial judge abused his discretion in sentencing by failing to personalize
the sentence and by instead sending McGuire to prison based solely on the fact that he
was convicted of operating a methamphetamine laboratory.1
Although "[t]he decision whether to grant probation is within the complete
discretion of the trial court," sentencing decisions are overturned when a trial court
n

exceed[s] the bounds of discretion." (State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct.

App. 1991)). "A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when, among other things,
'"it fails to consider all legally relevant factors."'" State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, Tf8, 40

1

This Court has jurisdiction to consider this issue pursuant to Rule 4(b), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pursuant to that rule, the time for filing a notice of appeal
from the judgment is suspended until after the trial court rules on a timely motion under
Rule 59(e). In this case, McGuire filed his notice of appeal within thirty days of the
denial of his motion for reconsideration. Assuming that motion is characterized as a
Rule 59(e) motion, as argued in Point I of this brief, McGuire's notice of appeal
encompassed the ruling on the motion for reconsideration as well as the judgment itself.
16

P.3d 626 (quoting State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 12345 1235 (Utah 1990) (further citations
omitted)). MA sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light
of his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which
underlie the criminal justice system.11 State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah
1980). A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when it "focusfes] on the nature
of the crime to the exclusion of any other factor relevant to sentencing." Commonwealth
v. Plasterer, 529 A.2d 37, 39 (Pa. Super. 1987).
Due process and Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure implicitly require
that a sentence imposed on a criminal defendant be personalized. Rule 22(a) mandates
that trial courts afford both the defendant and the prosecutor the opportunity to present
information relevant to sentence. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a); see. also State v. Wanosik,
2003 UT 46,1fi[18-23, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 35. Due process requires that a sentence be
based on reliable and relevant information. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^[18-23; State v.
Howell. 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah
1993) {superceded by statute on other grounds, State v. Trvba. 2000 UT App 230).
Moreover, due process requires that a presentence investigation report be disclosed to a
defendant prior to sentencing. State v. Cesarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982).
Implicit in these due process and Rule 22(a) requirements is the recognition that
information other than the nature of the charge is pertinent to sentencing since the due
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process and Rule 22(a) requirements would be meaningless and unnecessary if a judge
could impose sentence based solely on the nature of the charge.
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sentence based solely
on the fact that McGuire was convicted of operating a methamphetamine laboratory and
had acknowledged that he attempted to cook methamphetamine in that lab three times.
R. 82:5-6. The judge's statement clearly indicates that his concern was that the
manufacturing of methamphetamine puts the community at risk by subjecting others to
the possibility of contamination and exposure and that methamphetamine labs are ,fa
plague to the community." R. 82:5-6. Rather than personalizing the sentence by
considering McGuire's amenability to treatment and probation, desire to change, minimal
criminal record, and other factors that led the state to agree to recommend probation and
caused the AP&P agent to recommend probation, the judge focused solely on the danger
caused by methamphetamine manufacturing. The sentencing in this case could apply to
any defendant convicted of operating a clandestine laboratory, with the only alteration
being how many times the defendant admitted to trying to cook methamphetamine.
While "'the trial court's silence, by itself, [does not] presuppose[] that the court
did not consider the proper factors as required by law"1 (State v. Wright, 2003 UT App
435 (unpublished) (quoting Helms, 2002 UT 12, Tfl 1)), the trial judge's statements in this
case indicate that he did not consider the proper factors and instead imposed prison based
solely on one factor-the nature of the crime. This case is unlike Wright and Helms
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where the trial court's failure to expressly acknowledge various mitigating factors did not
require resentencing because it could not be assumed that the judge did not consider
those factors. See Wright, 2003 UT App 435, ffi[5-6. By contrast, in this case the judge
expressly stated that he was going against the recommendation for probation and
imposing prison because McGuire was convicted of operating a methamphetamine
laboratory and methamphetamine laboratories are dangerous and a plague on society.
Given the judge's statement, it is not reasonable to assume that he considered all of the
mitigating factors relevant to sentencing or personalized McGuire's sentence, as required
by Rule 22(a) and due process.
The specifics of this case showed that McGuire was a good candidate for
probation. McGuire had a minimal criminal history. PSP.2. Until two years before his
arrest, McGuire primarily used alcohol rather than drugs. PSI:2. McGuire began to
think about cooking methamphetamine in the misguided hope that he could alleviate his
financial problems and save his house. PSI:2. He had the lab in operation for only about
two weeks and had tried to cook methamphetamine only three times, without much
success. PSI:3. McGuire was remorseful and honest, recognized "that he has lost
everything that he once had because of his drug usage," and was "glad it was over."
PSI:2, 3. By ignoring this information and otherwise failing to personalize the sentence
and instead sending McGuire to prison based solely on the fact that he was convicted of

19

operating a methamphetamine lab, the judge essentially turned this type of conviction
into a mandatory prison conviction and abused his discretion in sentencing.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Shawn C. McGuire respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.
SUBMITTED this xi** day of December, 2003.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CHARGES
1. OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY - 1st Degree Felony
Disposition: 06/24/2002 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Case No: 021906198
Date:
Aug 12, 2 002

The defendant's probation is revoked.
The defendant is to serve the sentence as imposed in the original
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ADDENDUM B

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds, Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit
of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than
10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits: time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.

Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general.
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance
with these rules.
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings in
uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of
any judgment or order entered.
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply to civil
actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar as such rules are
by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings therein.
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board
or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure in appealing
from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of an
administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or
inconsistent with these rules.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall also
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any
statutory or constitutional requirement.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendants arrest may be
issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court
shall so specify in the sentencing order.
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.)

Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned
either in evidence or in argument.
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1
2

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in the

3

presence and hearing of the defendant:)

4
5

THE COURT:

This is State of Utah versus Shawn
It f s set for sentencing.

6

McGuire, Case 021906198.

7

Ms. Sisneros, have you reviewed the presentence report.

8

MS. SISNEROS:

9

THE COURT:

10

Yes, I have.

Are there any errors or ommissions,

inaccuracies you want to bring to my attention?

11

MS. SISNEROS:

12

THE COURT:

13

No.

Do you want to address the

recommendations?

14

MS. SISNEROS:

Your Honor, Mr. McGuire has received

15 J the presentence report, has been a very cooperative client,
16

very honest.

17 I
18

And, all along, with everybody, he's been very
cooperative.

And he ! s, quite frankly, been a great client to

19 j work with.
20

As indicated in the presentence report, and as he

21

told the officers, this was not something that he was intending

22

on selling.

23

It was just for personal use.

He made some really bad choices and bad decisions

24

about how to handle a financial situation, and he f s certainly

25

paying the price for that now.

1

I think all in all it is a very favorable

2

recommendation.

3

far as everything in here, I know that Mr. McGuire will do

4

whatever it is that your Honor requires him to do.

5

jail time, I know that he'll do that as well.

6

remorseful about whatf s happened.

7
8

The one thing I would like to address, and as

I would like to address the jail.

If that's

He is incredibly

He's done 97 days.

We would ask you give him credit for that time.

9

If you are going to sentence him to the year, if you

10 I would consider releasing him once we can get him in to a
11

program.

12

intensive —

13

program.

14
15
16

We've already started that process of looking in to
I'm thinking looking in to an intensive inpatient

That's what we're looking at in our office.
If you give him a year, if you would allow him early

release to a program.
Another option would be letting him out on an ankle

17

monitor pending our ability to get him in to a program.

18

think that's the viable option for him.

19

I

This is a difficult case in that I think Mr. McGuire

20

has been just very cooperative.

21

very concerned about what it is that he's done, and I would ask

22

that you take that in to consideration in this sentencing.

23

THE COURT:

24

MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN:

25

Taylor's case.

Thank you.

He's very mild-mannered and

Ms. Bernards-Goodman?
Your Honor, this is Lana

She's reviewed the report and strongly agrees

1

with the year in jail with no credit for good time.

2

that the defendant is fortunate it's not a prison

3

recommendation.

4

THE COURT:

She feels

Mr. McGuire, I have reviewed the

5

presentence report.

I find it an extremely favorable

6

recommendation and it's one I'm not inclined to follow; though

7 I I normally do.
8 J
9
10
11

In fact, I've read it more than once because of the
recommendation.

It's troubling in the fact that what you say

is the lab was set up for personal use.
But there was also continued -- this is the third

12

time you tried to do it, and were having a hard time complying.

13

In my opinion, there's a bigger issue besides just your

14

personal use and your involvement in the operation of a lab,

15

and that's it's very concerning to the rest of the community

16

and the rest of this society.

17

our community.

18

And I believe it's a plague on

Once we start manufacturing, once we start trying to

19

cook this kind of material, methamphetamine, it affects

20

children's lives.

It affects your life.

It puts at risk your

21 J life or anybody involved in the process, those around you.
22

You're subject to possible exposure, fires, other

23

contamination.

24
25

So, I'm going to go against the recommendation in
this case, and I'm going to sentence you to five years to life

1

in the state penitentiary.

And I'm not trying to send that

2

message to anybody, I'm just telling you my opinion.

3

Methamphetamine labs are something that will not be tolerated.

4

Good luck.

5
6

(Whereupon, the instant proceedings came to a close.)
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ADDENDUM D

UTAH CODE OK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority.
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and
other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences in class A
misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities which are under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except
treason or impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released
upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures,
or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated.
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The
chair shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and in
accordance with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings
involving commutation and pardons. The chair may participate on any
panel and when doing so is chair of the panel. The chair of the board may
designate the chair for any other panel.
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution
remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated, except after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed
examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection other
than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board.
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing
before the board.
(e) The board shall determine restitution in an amount that does not
exceed complete restitution if determined by the court in accordance with
Section 76-3-201.
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the
hearing shall be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's
office responsible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law
enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction,
and whenever possible, the victim or the victim's family.
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by
the board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand.
(3) Decisions of the board in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations
or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are
final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents the
obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment, including restitution as provided
in Section 77-27-6.
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment.
However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the
Board of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or
pardon the offense as provided. In the case of conviction for treason, the
governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or
commute the sentence, or direct its execution.
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders
serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have
their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated,
the board shall consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to
make restitution as ascertained in accordance with the standards and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole, pardon, remission of
fines or forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence.
(6) In determining whether parole may be terminated, the board shall
consider the offense committed by the parolee, the parole period as provided in

